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1 Introduction
During the last three decades developed countries have recognized the need for regulating polluting agents, since they incur harmful and irreversible damage on human health and on the
environment (see Stern, 2007). As a result national and international environmental agencies,
such as EPA, founded in 1970, and EEA, founded in 1995, oversee and ensure the e¢ cient and
e¤ective regulation of pollution.
In general, there are two ways to regulate industrial pollution: (a) through the use of
quantity constraints, which translate into several forms of maximum emission standards or
pollution permits; and (b) through emission taxes. A voluminous literature referred to as
“strategic environmental policy literature”demonstrates how environmental policy instruments
can be used as second best instruments for international trade purposes when traditional trade
taxes, subsidies and quotas are prohibited or restricted due to international trade agreements.
Speci…cally, in the context of international oligopolistic competition, among others, Conrad
(1993), Barrett (1994), Kennedy (1994), Rauscher (1994), Ulph (1996a), Ulph and Valentini
(2001) and Neary (2006) conclude that when …rms compete in outputs governments, in an
e¤ort to enhance the international competitiveness of their exporting …rms, have a unilateral
incentive to pursue laxer environmental policy, i.e., use of lax emission standards or emission
taxes.1
Another strand of the literature compares the welfare and pollution implications for open
economies of the di¤erent environmental policy instruments, i.e., emissions standards vis-à-vis
emissions taxes. For example, Ulph (1996b) in an imperfectly competitive trade model where
two countries produce a single polluting commodity and …rms are allowed to strategically invest
in capital, demonstrates that, …rst, the use of emissions standards over taxes need not be a
dominant strategy, and second the choice of the environmental policy instrument has an impact
on producers’strategic (investment) behavior, output, pollution, and thus welfare.2 Recently,
Lahiri and Ono (2007) extend the above results by comparing the e¤ects of an emissions tax and
1
Empirical support concerning ecological dumping can be found in Fredriksson and Millimet (2002), Ederington and Minier (2003), Ederington et al. (2005) and Levinson and Taylor (2008).
2
Ulph (1996b), assumes that governments select their policy instruments in a way satisfying international
agreements. Hence, governments cannot select their policies strategically. An emissions tax (standard) leads
to higher welfare over a standard (tax) if a country is a signi…cant consumer (producer) of the polluting good.
Moreover, emissions standards relative to taxes or to no environmental policy reduce a country’s strategic incentive
for overinvestment.
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of a relative emissions standard on the levels of pollution and welfare. They conclude, among
other things, that with a …xed number of …rms a relative emissions standard is welfare-superior
to an emissions equivalent emissions tax, while an emissions tax is emissions-superior to a welfare
equivalent relative emissions standard. The authors, however, do not consider asymmetric cases
where each country implements a di¤erent policy instrument, and thus do not obtain a full payo¤
matrix and do not attain Nash equilibria of the game. Yanase (2007) examines the welfare and
pollution e¤ects of emissions standards and taxes in a dynamic game model of international
competition with many countries, cross-border pollution which accumulates over time, and
governments which either all choose the same or di¤erent from each other policy instrument.
He concludes that in a non-cooperative policy game, standards are favored over taxes since the
latter entail larger strategic distortions, e.g., terms of trade, abatement costs and environmental
damage e¤ects, relative to emission taxes, thus resulting to higher pollution and lower welfare.
From the above reviewed literature it can be argued that, by and large, in the context of
open economies and imperfect competition emissions standards relative to taxes lead to lower
levels of pollution and higher welfare, since they leave …rms with less ‡exibility, thus weakening
the prisoner’s dilemma amongst competing governments (countries).
A notable feature, among others, of the strategic environmental policy literature reviewed
above is that of complete information for all agents, i.e., …rms and governments. Here we
develop a model of an international duopoly, where we assume that exporting …rms are better
informed than their respective national governments in regards to demand conditions, or cost of
abatement or …nally in terms of environmental damage caused by production of their polluting
output. The modeling and methodology of the present paper synthesizes various analytical
features of the above reviewed literature as well as features of the literature on strategic trade
policy under imperfect competition. This synthesis, despite its practical and real world relevance
has not been attempted to date. Speci…cally, we use a model of an international duopoly a-la
Barrett (1994), while the invoked modes of uncertainty in demand, abatement cost and pollution
damage functions follow along the lines of closed economy models of environmental policy, e.g.,
Weitzman (1974). The modes of strategic environmental policy we consider are equivalent to
those of strategic trade policy with imperfectly competitive markets and uncertainty in the
seminal paper by Cooper and Reizman (1989), henceforth C-R’89. In C-R’89, the sole source
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of uncertainty is the structure of demand, and governments choose strategically between trade
quotas and trade subsidies in order to shift pro…ts in favor of their exporting …rms. Here, trade
quotas and subsidies are replaced by emissions standards and emissions taxes, which we rank in
terms of their expected welfare e¤ects, when governments strategically choose these instruments
in order not only to shift pro…ts in favor of their exporting …rms but also to regulate pollution.3
Our …ndings verify that in the context of imperfect competition and complete information
emissions standards are welfare superior to emissions taxes. Furthermore, we argue that under
certainty, using standards not only leads to welfare superior outcomes, but it also constitutes a
dominant strategy for each regulator and thus a Nash equilibrium strategy for each government.
Nonetheless, we also claim that uncertainty should play a key role in the decision of the optimal
policy instrument. In particular we introduce uncertainty either in the demand intercept, or in
the intercepts of the marginal abatement cost and marginal damage functions. Then we provide
su¢ cient conditions under which it is optimal for the regulator to select an emissions tax to
regulate pollution, in contrast to the aforementioned literature.
Our result is in line with several empirical studies. Few of them presented by Harrington et
al. (2004), illustrate that di¤erent countries frequently face identical environmental problems
through the use of di¤erent policy instruments. In particular, they provide twelve case studies
on six environmental problems and they illustrate that the US and several EU countries apply
di¤erent policy instruments in each case. As illustrated in Howe (1994), the United States has
employed quantitative restrictions of emissions while EU countries preferred to control pollution
through a tax. Additionally, many industries in Japan opposed the implementation of a carbon
tax, yet there are increasing numbers of …rms willing to conform with quantity constraints. This
paper may help understand any possible preferences of standards over taxes and vice-versa.

2 The Model
We consider a model of a symmetric international duopoly, where each …rm is located in a
di¤erent country (home and foreign) and produces an identical and homogenous good consumed
3

Nannerup (1998) introduced uncertainty about …rms’ costs in a strategic environmental policy model with
a similar structure to ours. However, in contrast to our model, Nannerup allows the implementation of both
standards and lump sum taxes, simultaneously, and thus the construction of a truth revealing contract is possible.
Furthermore, Nannerup does not examine the choice of an optimal policy instrument which is the aim of this
paper.
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in a third country, e.g., rest of the world (ROW). Consumer preferences in ROW can be mapped
into a quasi-linear utility function which yields an a¢ ne linear inverse demand, p = B x X + ,
where B is the demand intercept, x and X are the output levels for the domestic and the foreign
…rm, respectively, and

is a random variable re‡ecting positive or negative additive demand

shocks. This random variable is assumed to follow a distribution with mean zero.4
Both …rms have the same production technology, and for simplicity a unit of production
generates a unit of a purely local pollutant (z). Further for simplicity we assume that an
exogenous end-of-the-pipe abatement technology (a) exists for the …rm and thus net pollution
equals production minus abatement carried out by the …rm,

z=x

a:

(1)

The abatement cost function is assumed to be convex of the form:
1
ca = ga2 + au;
2

(2)

where g is a positive scalar, which determines the cost of pollution control and u is an error
term following a distribution with zero mean. The introduction of the stochastic term u can be
interpreted as a shock occurring in the abatement cost function, re‡ecting our assumption that
governments, contrary to …rms, are less informed about the exact position of ca .5 The pro…t
function of the domestic …rm depends on the policy instrument chosen by the government in
order to regulate pollution and it is given by the following expression:

= (B

x

X + )x

cx

ca

tz;

(3)

where c is the marginal cost of production (common for both …rms) which exhibits constant
4

Throughout the paper the foreign country’s variables and functions are indicated with upper case letters. Due
to assumed symmetry, the comparative statics analysis is carried out primarily in terms of home country variables.
The variables of the foreign country are equivalently derived. Furthermore, the way uncertainty is introduced
and all functions chosen throughout the paper are chosen such that the results obtained are comparable to the
ones in the relevant literature. We assume that when takes negative values, interior solutions for our variables
are still obtained. This could be described by a truncated normal distribution with zero mean.
5
The form of the stochastic term (u) leads to parallel shifts of the marginal cost of the abatement function.
For simplicity, we assume that the intercept of the marginal function equals to zero. This assumption appears
to be innocuous since the implications remain una¤ected if we assume an abatement cost function of the form
ca = 21 g1 a2 + g1 a + au + g3 , where gi > 0, i = 1; 2; 3.
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returns to scale, and tz are the tax payments due to pollution when a tax is the policy instrument
in use.6 When the government implements an emissions standard, then tz = 0. The choice
variables of the …rms are output and the level of abatement.
Regulation of pollution by the governments takes place prior to production decisions. We
examine two di¤erent ways of regulating pollution. First, we assume that governments can use
an emissions standard, i.e., a quantity constraint setting the maximum allowed level of total
emissions for the …rms. Additional emissions must be abated by the …rm. In this case the choice
variable for the …rm is the level of output. Production generated emissions must coincide with
the standard (z) set by the government.7 The alternative policy instrument available to the
governments is a tax (t) for each unit of emissions. In this case, the choice variables for the
…rm are the level of output and pollution abatement. Governments in the two countries in both
regimes choose the optimal level of regulation by maximizing social welfare given by:

w=

+ tz

d;

(4)

where d stands for the damage caused from pollution and has the following form:
1
d = kz 2 + z ;
2

(5)

where the coe¢ cient k is positive and determines the injuriousness of the pollutant. Similarly
to the abatement cost function, we assume that the damage function is stochastic and depends
on a random variable, , which also follows a distribution where its expected value equals zero.8
Throughout the paper we assume that uncertainties in the demand, abatement cost and damage
6
The results are not a¤ected qualitatively if we allow for decreasing returns to scale. Note also that in order
to calculate total marginal cost of production both in the cases of standards and taxes we need to take into
account how changes in output a¤ect the cost abatement and the tax expenditures respectively. Algebraically,
total marginal cost of production in the case of taxes is tmct = c + t, while the corresponding one for the case of
c; for x z
standards is tmcs =
.
c + g(x z); for x > z
7
Note that standards and pollution permits are equivalent policy instruments only in the case where the latter
are non-tradable. However, in our case tradable permits cannot be introduced since the pollutant is assumed to
be local and thus there is no reason for the governments to accept licences of a …rm located in a di¤erent country.
8
It is more realistic to assume that is unobservable by both the governments and the …rms, as there is no
reason to assume that the …rms are better informed about the damages caused from pollution to the society.
However, in order to have a unique informational structure in the model and remain consistent with the timing
of revelation of the other modes of uncertainty we assume that, contrary to the governments, is revealed to
the …rms. This does not a¤ect the results, since uncertainty in the damage cost function appears to play no role
in the decisions of the …rms.
is also introduced in such a way that a shock results in a parallel shift of the
marginal damage function.
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functions are uncorrelated.
The time structure of the model follows that of C-R’89 and it is based on the assumption
that governments in general are less informed about …rms’demand and cost functions, than the
…rms are. Hence:
Stage 1 The governments choose the policy regime (standards or taxes).
Stage 2 The governments choose the actual policy levels (tax rate or emission standard) to
maximize local welfare.
Stage 3 Uncertainty is revealed to the …rms.
Stage 4 Firms compete in output to maximize pro…ts.

3 Optimal Policy Instrument with Several Modes of Uncertainty
In order to determine which policy instrument is chosen we derive the Nash equilibrium of the
game taking into account all the possible choices of both governments. In other words, we derive
the full payo¤ matrix of expected welfare levels for every possible contingency, i.e., when the
domestic and the foreign governments implement the same or di¤erent policy instruments.

3.1 Both Governments Implement Emission Standards
In order to derive the Bayes Nash equilibrium for this case we solve the problem backwards.
Hence, our solution starts from the …nal stage of the game, where …rms compete in outputs
given that both governments choose emission standards to regulate pollution. Recall that, when
standards are used as instruments, the only control variable left to …rms is production, while
abatement can only take the value that satis…es equation (1). Bearing this in mind, we maximize
domestic pro…ts with respect to output and obtain the reaction function of output,
d
dx

=

0

s:t: a

=

x

()
where

@x
@X

=

1
2+g

x=

z
B

c+

u X + gz
;
2+g

(6)

< 0 is the slope of the domestic …rm’s reaction function. We observe from

the reaction function given in (6) that output adjusts positively when a positive demand shock
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occurs, yet this adjustment is proportionally lower than the shock per se. Solving simultaneously
the domestic and the respective foreign …rms’reaction functions, we obtain equilibrium outputs
as a function, among other things, of domestic and foreign emission standards:

x=

(B

c+

u)(1 + g) + g(2 + g)z
(1 + g)(3 + g)

gZ

:

(7)

From equation (7) and the respective foreign equilibrium output we obtain that
dx
dZ

< 0 and

dX
dz

dx
dz

> 0,

dX
dZ

> 0,

< 0. The last two derivatives imply that when regulation abroad is relaxed,

local output falls due to the negative slope of the reaction function (6). This derivative is the
core of the so called "strategic environmental policy" literature, since it creates incentives for
the governments to relax regulation in order to favor, i.e., shift pro…ts, the exporting …rms.
Since governments do not know the exact position of demand, abatement and damage functions, given equilibrium outputs in both countries, they select the optimal level of emission
standards by maximizing expected welfare (i.e., Ew = E

dEw
dz

=

()
where

1

E

8
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
<

@ @x
>
>
|@x{z@z}
>
>
>
>
>
>
zero due to
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
F.O.C
>
>
>
>
>
:

z=

g(2 + g)2 [(B

+

@
@z
|{z}

+

Ed):

@ @X
@X
| {z@z}

direct

strategic

e¤ect

e¤ect

(+)

(+)

c)(1 + g)

gZ]

;

@d
@z
|{z}

9
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
=

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
regulation >
>
>
>
>
>
>
bene…t >
>
>
>
>
>
;
(+)

=0

(8)

1

= g f9 + 2g [8 + g(5 + g)]g + (1 + g)2 (3 + g)2 k. Equation (8) gives the reaction function

of the domestic regulator. That is,

@z
@Z

< 0 implies that domestic and foreign emission standards

are strategic substitutes (see Bulow et al., 1985). If the foreign regulator tightens its standard
then the domestic laxes its own and the reverse. Strategic substitutability of standards follows
when the standard is tighter in one country, thus, production in that country falls, which in
turn increase the production of the rival …rm through the output reaction function in (6). As

8
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a result, the …rm in that country faces a higher marginal cost of abatement and the regulator
a tighter strategic incentive which amplify the direct and strategic e¤ects respectively, and in
turn force the rival regulator to relax further the standard.
Solving simultaneously (7), the domestic government’s reaction function (8) and the corresponding equations for the foreign …rm and government we obtain the Bayes Nash equilibrium:
8
>
< x =X =
>
:

(B c)(1+g)(3+g)(g+k)
m

z =Z =

+

u
3+g

9
>
=
>
;

(B c)g(2+g)2
m

;

(9)

where m = g[9+g(11+3g)]+(1+g)(3+g)2 k. These are the equilibrium levels of outputs chosen
by the …rms and emission standards chosen by the governments. Abatement can be calculated
through equation (1). Since the standard is set by the government it does not depend on

and

u, while output is volatile since demand and abatement are stochastic. However, equilibrium
outputs increase (decrease) less in absolute terms when a positive shock occurs in the demand
intercept (marginal cost of abatement), than the change per se and vice-versa. Moreover, the
strategic e¤ect is positive and creates an incentive to relax regulation (increase z) compared to
the case where it is equal to zero, which describes the …rst best scenario where regulation is set
such that marginal cost of abatement and marginal damage are equalized, i.e.,

@
@z

=

@d
@z ,

and

thus the externality is fully internalized. In order to determine the level of expected welfare in
the case of standards we substitute equilibrium values given in (9) and the implied abatement
level in (1), into (4). After taking expectations and some algebraic manipulation we get:9

EwzZ =

(B

c)2 (g + k)(2 + g)
2m2

1

+

(2 + g)
var( ) +
2(3 + g)2
|
{z
}

CR bene…t for standards

(2 + g)
var(u)
2(3 + g)2
|
{z
}

; (10)

modi…ed CR bene…t for standards

where the subscripts denote that a standard is used in both countries, var( ) is the meanpreserving spread distribution (variance) of the demand intercept and var(u) stands for the
variance of marginal cost of abatement.
The second right hand side term of (10) indicates that expected welfare depends positively
on var( ), i.e., ex ante welfare increases with uncertainty. Two opposing e¤ects determine
this outcome. The positive e¤ect is due to the convexity of the pro…t function in terms of the
9

All the calculations in the paper are carried out using Mathematica 6.
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demand intercept and it is similar to the ones introduced by C-R’89 and Creane and Miyagiwa’s
(2008) strategic trade models. Another interpretation of this result is that since …rms are better
informed about , expected pro…ts, thus expected welfare depend positively on var( ), as the
damage from pollution is not a¤ected by the demand variability because pollution is …xed at
the selected level. The negative e¤ect, absent from the strategic trade models, is attributed to
the convexity of the abatement cost function, which implies that high var( ) entails a negative
impact on expected pro…ts and thus welfare. Nonetheless, the positive e¤ect is stronger than
the negative one and thus the overall e¤ect is positive. We denote the overall outcome as "CR"
bene…t due to the similarity with the one introduced in C-R’89 and, thus, expected welfare
depends positively on var( ) as illustrated in equation (10).
The third right hand side term of (10) may be interpreted similarly; The positive sign in
front of var(u) re‡ects the fact that the …rms are better informed than the governments. We
denote this as "modi…ed CR" bene…t. This bene…t stems from the form of the abatement cost
function. Each …rm, after observing the actual value of u, adapts abatement through output
decisions creating a positive component in the expected welfare level. Again a negative e¤ect
appears with uncertainty attributed to lower expected revenues as var(u) magni…es. Since the
positive e¤ect outweighs the negative one, expected welfare depends positively on var(u).

3.2 Both Governments Implement Emission Taxes
We now assume that both governments impose taxes to control pollution. Now …rms have two
available control variables, output and the abatement level. Solving backwards we derive the
…rst order conditions for the domestic …rm:
B
d
= 0 () x =
dx

c

t+
2

X

;

d
t u
= 0 () ga + u = t () a =
:
da
g

(11)

(12)

The output reaction function of the domestic …rm is given in equation (11). As in the case
of standards, laxer environmental policy, i.e., lower tax, shifts the output reaction function
outwards. This drives the …rm to increase its output. Moreover, we observe that when taxes
are used, the output reaction function becomes steeper than the corresponding one in the case of
standards, and results to a more aggressive behavior in output rivalry. The pro…t maximizing
10
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condition with respect to abatement is given by equation (12) and states that the marginal
cost of abatement equals the pollution tax. The equilibrium values of outputs as a function of
taxes and the parameters of the model are obtained by solving the domestic and foreign …rms’
reaction functions simultaneously:

x=

B

c+

2t + T
3

:

(13)

From equation (13) and the respective foreign equilibrium output we obtain that
dx
dT

> 0 and

dX
dt

dx
dt

< 0,

dX
dT

< 0,

> 0. The strategic e¤ect, similarly to the case of standards, is founded in the

last two partial derivatives, which imply that when an emissions tax abroad is lowered, local
output falls due to the negative slope of the reaction function (11).
Next we examine the domestic government’s decision for the optimal tax. Governments
maximize expected welfare with respect to the emissions tax. Thus, for home we have:

dEw
dt

=
()

where

2

@ @x @ @a
@ @X
@
@(tz)
+
+
+
+
@x @t
@a @t
@X @t
@t
@t
g[3k + g( 1 + 2k)](B c + T )
t=
;

E

@d @z
@z @t

=0
(14)

2

= g(9 + 4g) + (3 + 2g)2 k. Equation (14) gives the home government’s reaction function

in the case of emission taxes. If 3k + g( 1 + 2k) > 0 taxes are strategic complements, which as
we will see later, is a necessary condition for the existence of an interior solution in equilibrium,
i.e., non-negativity of taxes. For example, when the domestic government lowers its tax, the
domestic …rm increases its output. This leads to lower foreign output through the reaction
function and therefore the foreign tax is also reduced, implying the strategic complementarity
of taxes. The main implication of strategic complementarity is that a potential rivalry in tax
competition would cause a vicious cycle of relaxing taxes (i.e., a race to the bottom), which
would inevitably harm both the environment and …rms pro…ts since …rms produce too much
output. On the other hand, if 3k + g( 1 + 2k) < 0, taxes are strategic substitutes and results
to a negative pollution tax (a pollution subsidy). This is infeasible as it implies a negative level
of abatement (see equation (12)). For obvious reasons, this possibility is omitted from the rest
of the analysis.
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In order to obtain the equilibrium levels of outputs, taxes, and pollution in the two countries
we solve simultaneously equations (1), (12), (13) and (14) and the corresponding equations for
the foreign …rm and government, to obtain:
8
>
>
x = XT = (B
>
>
< t
zt = ZT = 2(B
>
>
>
>
: t = T = (B

c)(3+2g)(g+k)
n
c)g(2+g)
n

+

3

+

3

+

u
g

c)g[3k+g( 1+2k)]
n

9
>
>
>
>
=
>
>
>
>
;

;

(15)

where n = g(9 + 5g) + (3 + g)(3 + 2g)k and abatement in equilibrium is implied by (12), i.e.,
a =

t

u
g

. As already mentioned, k >

g
3+2g

is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the

existence of an interior solution. Comparing the solutions (15) and (9) several inferences can
be drawn that play a signi…cant role in determining the expected national welfare levels. When
emission taxes are implemented instead of standards, the greater slopes of output reaction
functions and the strategic complementarity of taxes, lead to higher output and pollution in
equilibrium.
Furthermore, in contrast to the case of emission standards, when taxes are implemented,
pollution is stochastic as it depends on production and abatement, which are random due to
involved demand and abatement cost uncertainty. This is so as, the total marginal cost of
production runs steeper when a standard is used, in contrast to the case of a tax where the
marginal cost is horizontal (see footnote 6). Hence, …rms are more ‡exible in the case of taxes
rather than in the case of standards. This is illustrated in Figure 1:
p

B
TMCs

E s2
Et1

E

TMCt
Et2

Es1

c
A

MR1x

MRx

MR2x

x

Figure 1
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The total marginal cost of production when a tax is the policy instrument, is obtained through
equation (3) and equals c + t, which is represented in Figure 1 by the horizontal line T M Ct .
The total marginal cost of production when a pollution quota is the chosen policy instrument,
is obtained again from (3) and is represented by the kinked line cAB. The kink at point
A denotes that from this point onwards the standard becomes binding. We initially assume
that the equilibrium is at point E, where the total marginal cost of output, when a standard
or a tax is used, are equal and intersect the marginal revenue (M Rx ). Two possible shocks
are represented in the demand intercept (one negative and one positive, which shift marginal
revenue from M Rx to M Rx1 and M Rx2 , respectively) and four new equilibria are obtained (Et1
and Et2 for taxes, and Es1 and Es2 for standards). From this we observe that the equilibrium
output becomes less responsive to demand variability when a standard is implemented rather
than a pollution tax.
Substituting the new equilibrium levels from (15) and abatement obtained from (12) into
(4) and taking expectations, we obtain the expected welfare for each country:

EwtT =

(2 + g)(g + k)(B
2n2

c)2

2

1
var( )
|9 {z }

+

CR bene…t for taxes

+

1
var(u)
2g
| {z }

modi…ed CR bene…t for taxes

k
k
var( )
var(u) =
18
2g 2
(2 + g)(g + k)(B c)2 2 (k 2)
(g k)
var( ) +
var(u):
2n2
18
2g 2

(16)

In contrast to the case of standards, expected welfare is a negative function of var( ) when
k > 2. Nonetheless, if k < 2, expected welfare depends positively on the variance of the
demand intercept. This re‡ects the fact that pollution is now stochastic as it is determined
by the di¤erence of production minus abatement carried out in equilibrium. Subsequently, the
higher the variance of the demand function is, the more stochastic is pollution and has a negative
e¤ect on welfare. However, as in the previous case, expected pro…ts depend positively on var( )
due to the existence of the CR bene…t. In particular, the CR bene…t is magni…ed because …rms
have greater ‡exibility in output competition (see Figure 1) and abatement is deterministic
which implies that abatement cost is constant. The overall e¤ect of var( ) on expected welfare
is ambiguous. If the damage caused from the pollutant is severe enough (k > 2) then the
negative e¤ect implied by the variability in the damage function is greater than the CR bene…t.
13
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Expected welfare falls as uncertainty rises, while the opposite holds when the pollutant is less
harmful.
A similar reasoning applies for the e¤ect of uncertainty on marginal abatement cost over
expected welfare. The presence of uncertainty implies higher expected welfare attributed to the
modi…ed CR bene…t. Compared to the case of standards this bene…t is now higher because
…rms have two choice variables. One is output and the other is abatement. Hence, the …rms
use their abatement decisions in order to conform with the actual level of abatement cost, while
output decisions remain una¤ected. This implies that the implementation of taxes creates only
a positive e¤ect in terms of expected pro…ts. However, a negative e¤ect on expected welfare
also appears, since pollution is stochastic and thus damage from pollution is stochastic as well.
Which of the two e¤ects prevails, depends on the scalars g and k that determine the slopes
of marginal cost of abatement and marginal damage, respectively. In particular, as it can be
observed from equation (16) when k > g, i.e., the marginal damage is steeper than the marginal
cost of abatement, the negative e¤ect o¤sets the positive one, the expected welfare level depends
negatively on var(u), and vice-versa.

3.3 The Asymmetric Case
We turn now to the case where one government uses a standard and the rival imposes a tax.
We only solve for the case where, in order to regulate pollution and shift rents towards the own
exporting …rm, the domestic government implements an emissions standard and the foreign uses
an emissions tax. The reverse problem is equivalent since the model is symmetric.
The problem is again solved by backwards induction. At the …nal stage …rms maximize
pro…ts. Because of the di¤erent choice of the policy instruments, the domestic …rm maximizes
pro…ts with respect to output, while the foreign with respect to output and abatement. The
reaction function of the output of the domestic …rm is given by equation (6), while the …rst
order conditions for the foreign …rm are given by (11) and (12) respectively. Solving these simultaneously, we attain the equilibrium levels of outputs as a function of the domestic emissions
standard and the foreign pollution tax:

x=

B

c+

(B
2u + 2gz + T
and X =
3 + 2g

c + )(1 + g) (2 + g)T
3 + 2g

gz + u

:

(17)
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From (17) we observe that when the domestic government relaxes its standard then domestic
output rises, while the foreign one falls. The reverse holds when the foreign government reduces
its own tax. Hence, even in the case that both governments select di¤erent policy instruments
the incentive to relax environmental policy for rent shifting purposes is still present and only
the magnitudes are a¤ected.
In light of (17), and given the assumed uncertainties, both regulators select the optimal level
of their policy instrument by maximizing expected welfare with respect to the corresponding
instrument.10 So, the domestic and foreign reaction functions are as follows:

z=

(B

c + T )2g(2 + g)

and T =

g[ g + (1 + g)(3 + g)k][(B

2

c)(1 + g)

gz]

:

(18)

1

The domestic government’s reaction function is positively sloped, since a decrease in the foreign
tax lowers the domestic output. In turn, marginal cost of abatement and the strategic incentive
are lowered and drive the regulator to tighten the standard. The foreign regulator’s reaction
function must be negatively sloped, since a decrease in the domestic standard increases foreign
output which requires a higher tax.11
Solving equations (17) and (18) together with the corresponding ones of (1) and (12) for the
foreign …rm, we obtain the Bayes Nash equilibrium levels of outputs, the domestic and foreign
pollution and the foreign tax:
8
>
xzT =
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
X = (B
>
>
< zT

10

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
:

(B c)(3+2g)(g+k)
q

3

+

2u
3+2g

c)(1+g)(g+k)(3+g)
q

4

+

(1+g) +u
3+2g

zzT =

ZzT =

2(B c)g(2+g)
q

(B c)g(2+g)2
q

TzT =

4

+

3

(1+g)(g +3u)
g(3+2g)

(B c)g[ g+(1+g)(3+g)k]
q

4

9
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
=
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
;

;

(19)

We follow a process equivalent to (8) and (14) for the home and the foreign country respectively.
Hence, the foreign tax and the domestic standard must be strategic substitutes (i.e. g +(1+g)(3+g)k > 0),
otherwise, as we will see right after, an interior solution for the foreign emission tax in equilibrium is not possible.
It can be veri…ed that the stability of the system is satis…ed by the slopes of the reaction functions given in (18).
11
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where
q = g 2 (3 + 2g)[9 + 2g(4 + g)] + g f54 + gf132 + g[120 + g(48 + 7g)]gg k
+(1 + g)2 (3 + g)2 (3 + 2g)k 2 ;
3

= g[3 + g(g + 3)] + (1 + g)2 (3 + g)k and

4

= g(g + 3) + (1 + g)(3 + 2g)k:

Following a similar reasoning to the one of the previous subsection we can understand why
domestic output is less sensitive to unanticipated shifts in demand (see Figure 1). Using the
equilibrium values given in (19) we are ready to calculate domestic and foreign expected welfare
levels when the home country uses an emissions standard, while the foreign country uses an
emissions tax:
1
EwzT = EWtZ = (2 + g)
2

and EWzT = EwtZ =

(B
0

1B
@
2

c)2 (g + k)
q2

(B c)2 (g+k)(2+g)
q2

2
3 2

2
4 1

+

var( )
4var(u)
+
(3 + 2g)2 (3 + 2g)2
(1+g)2 (k 2)
var(
(3+2g)2

9(1+g)
+ fg[9+2g(7+2g)]
2g 2 (3+2g)2

2 kg

var(u)

1

) C
A:

(20)

(21)

From (21) we infer that in the country where a tax is levied to regulate pollution, its expected
welfare, i.e., EWzT = EwtZ , depends either positively or negatively on var( ) and var(u). As
in the previous section this depends on how injurious the pollutant is to the citizens of this
country. In the country where an emissions standard is chosen, its expected welfare depends
positively on var( ) and var(u) because the CR bene…t and the modi…ed CR bene…t are still
present. This occurs regardless of the choice of the policy instrument in the rival country.

4 Form of Intervention
Having derived the expected welfare levels for all the possible policy combinations, we now
turn to the Nash equilibrium choice of a country’s policy instrument. In order to simplify the
analysis and attribute exactly to each mode of uncertainty its e¤ect on policy instrument choice
we will separate the analysis in two subcases: a) Uncertainty in demand and b) uncertainty in
abatement cost and damage functions.
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4.1 Uncertainty in Demand
In this subcase we assume that the stochastic terms u and

are equal to zero which imply that

var(u) = var( ) = 0. Before determing the Nash equilibria of the policy instrument choice game
we provide the optimal response of the domestic regulator for each possible policy instrument
chosen by the rival. Lemma 1 summarizes these results:12
Lemma 1:
a)When var( ), var(u)! 0, i.e., near certainty, choosing an emissions standard dominates
in terms of welfare the choice of an emissions tax, regardless of the other country’s choice of
policy instrument.
b) When var( ) is su¢ ciently high and the rival country chooses an emissions standard,
then choosing a tax is optimal if f

g
(1+g)(3+g)

<k<

gf15+2g[12+g(6+g)]g
(1+g)2 (3+g)2

.

c) When var( ) is su¢ ciently high and the rival country chooses an emissions tax, then
choosing a tax is optimal if f

g
(3+2g)

g(15+8g)
(3+2g)2

<k<

d) When var( ) is su¢ ciently high and

g
(3+2g)

.

<k<

g(3+2g)
,
(3+g)2

then both countries choosing a

tax welfare dominates to both choosing a standard.
Proof in Appendix
Using Lemma 1, we de…ne the Nash equilibrium both for the cases of certainty and uncertainty in the following proposition:
Proposition 1:
a) When var( ), var(u)! 0, the Nash equilibrium suggests that both countries regulate pollution through emission standards.
b) When var( ) is su¢ ciently high and

g
(3+2g)

<k<

gf15+2g[12+g(6+g)]g
,
(1+g)2 (3+g)2

then in the Nash

equilibrium both countries choose an emissions tax as a policy instrument.
c) When var( ) is su¢ ciently high and

g(15+8g)
(3+2g)2

>k >

gf15+2g[12+g(6+g)]g
,
(1+g)2 (3+g)2

then we obtain

two symmetric Nash equilibria in pure strategies where both countries select either a standard or
a tax, and one in mixed strategies where each regulator selects a standard or a tax with positive
probabilities.
12

Because of the invoked symmetry in the model, the Nash equilibrium policy choices of the foreign given
home’s policy choices are identical to those in Lemma 1.
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d) If k >

g(15+8g)
,
(3+2g)2

then both countries choose emission standards to deal with pollution

problems regardless of var( ). Finally, when k

2 , choosing standards is always an equilibrium

strategy independently of the value of g.
Proof in Appendix
The results in Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 can be interpreted as follows. First, as noted
in the reviewed literature, e.g., Lahiri and Ono (2007), Ulph (1992, 1996b) and Yanase (2007),
and as stated in parts (a) of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, in the absence of uncertainty or when
uncertainty converges to zero the Nash equilibrium choice of emissions standards over emission
taxes by all rival countries leads to welfare superior outcomes. However, as stated in the
remaining parts of the aforementioned lemma and proposition, at Nash equilibrium, this result
may be reversed when uncertainty, here in terms of demand conditions, exists. In particular,
when uncertainty is high and k is relatively low (lower than the critical values), then superior
welfare outcomes emerge when both countries choose emission taxes to regulate pollution. The
presence of demand uncertainty, given certain parameter values, it provides Nash equilibria in
a choice game where governments not only may select di¤erent policy instruments, but also the
use of emission taxes may be welfare superior to that of emission standards.
It can be shown that the derivatives of the critical values

gf15+2g[12+g(6+g)]g
(1+g)2 (3+g)2

and

g
(3+2g)

(which imply the use of taxes in equilibrium) with respect to g are increasing. Moreover, the
derivative of the …rst critical value is greater than that of the second, and it results to a greater
range of values of k that can support the use of pollution taxes in equilibrium, as g increases.
This is attributed to the fact that, for high values of g, when a standard is used as a policy
instrument, output becomes less sensitive to any possible demand shocks, since the marginal
cost of abatement and thus the marginal cost of production become steeper. As a result, the
CR bene…ts, attributed to the …rms and the high variability in demand, are now lower. This
does not occur when a tax is chosen, as the marginal cost of production is independent of g.
The CR bene…ts attributed to the …rm due to the use of a tax, remain unchanged irrespective
of the level of g. Moreover, the losses caused from the variability of pollution in the damage
function are now lower, since a greater g implies a steeper marginal abatement cost and thus
a lower variability in pollution. Putting these results together, intuitively we understand that
taxes become more attractive as a policy instrument when g is higher. Unless, the injuriousness
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of the pollutant is extremely high (i.e., k

2), emission taxes may emerge as an equilibrium

strategy.
We now turn to the analysis of the mixed strategies in part (c) of Proposition 1. Could
they be interpreted beyond the usual exercise of "‡ipping a coin over strategies"? One possible
explanation is that a mixed strategy can be seen as a pure strategy in both instruments, that
is, the regulator imposes both a standard and a tax. In line with this, the probability fraction
might indicate the percentages of standards and taxes to be imposed, of the respective optimal
levels of standards and taxes, when these instruments are imposed separately. However, this
issue deserves a more detailed analysis which lies out of the scope of this paper.
The welfare implications of Proposition 1 are signi…cant, since it notes cases where the
exporting countries can be better o¤ in terms of their expected welfare by choosing taxes over
emission standards. Hence, a Pareto superior outcome can be achieved in terms of expected
national welfare for the two exporting countries. Nonetheless, one might wonder what happens
with expected welfare in ROW and more importantly what happens in expected global welfare,
which is equal to the sum of the expected welfare values in each country. Concerning ROW’s
expected welfare it follows intuitively that taxes lead to a superior outcome since they imply
greater production by the exporting …rms and thus a lower price, increasing consumers’surplus.
When uncertainty is very high, the implementation of taxes leads to higher expected welfare
in every country and consequently to an increase of expected global welfare. If uncertainty is
rather low and the two exporting countries select standards, then expected welfare is lower in
ROW and therefore the e¤ect on expected global welfare becomes ambiguous.13
In terms of pollution it can be shown that the common scenario suggests that emission
standards lead to lower pollution in comparison to taxes, unless a signi…cant negative shock
a¤ects the demand (see Appendix). However, this does not a¤ect the third country’s welfare
since the pollutant is assumed to be local.

4.2 Uncertainty in the Cost of Abatement and Damage
We now consider the case of certainty in demand conditions, i.e.,

= 0 which implies that

var( ) = 0, while uncertainties in the cost of pollution abatement and damage caused from
13

These results can be shown also algebraically. However, the value added is minimal as the implications follow
directly from the analysis thus far. For an excellent survey see also Ulph (1997).
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pollution are present, as introduced by the stochastic terms in equations (2) and (5). Moreover,
recall that the stochastic terms (u) and ( ) are assumed uncorrelated.
One implication that we discretely avoid to discuss during the solution procedure is that
uncertainty about the damage function (var( )) does not appear in the expected welfare levels;
hence we do not expect that it will a¤ect the selection of the policy instrument. This result is in
line with Weitzman (1974), Fishelson (1976) and Adar and Gri¢ n (1976). The explanation is
that uncertainty in the damage function does not a¤ect …rms’decisions in the …nal stage of the
game. However, as Stavins (1996) points out, this is true only in the case where the stochastic
variables are uncorrelated.
The following lemma provides the optimal strategies for the determination of the new Nash
equilibria in the policy instrument choice game:
Lemma 2:
a) When var(u) is su¢ ciently high and the rival country chooses a standard, choosing a tax
is optimal if f

g
(1+g)(3+g)

<k<

gf27+2g[27+g(16+3g)]g
.
3(1+g)2 (3+g)2

b) When var(u) is su¢ ciently high and the rival country chooses a tax, choosing a tax is
optimal if f

g
(3+2g)

<k<

g(9+4g)
.
(3+2g)2

c) When var(u) is su¢ ciently high, then both countries choosing standards, welfare dominates to choosing taxes if f k >

g(9+4g)
.
(3+g)2

Proof in Appendix
From Lemma 2 we can derive the following proposition:
Proposition 2:
a) When var(u) is su¢ ciently high and

g
(3+2g)

<k<

g(9+4g)
,
(3+2g)2

then in the Nash equilibrium

both countries choose emission taxes as a policy instrument.
b) When var(u) is su¢ ciently high and

g(9+4g)
(3+2g)2

<k<

gf27+2g[27+g(16+3g)]g
,
3(1+g)2 (3+g)2

then we obtain

two asymmetric Nash equilibria in pure strategies where one government selects a tax and the
rival one chooses an emissions standard, and one in mixed strategies where each country selects
a policy instrument assigning positive probabilities.
c) If k >

gf27+2g[27+g(16+3g)]g
3(1+g)2 (3+g)2

then both governments in equilibrium choose an emissions

standard to deal with pollution problems regardless of var(u). Finally, when k

2 , choosing

standards is always an equilibrium strategy independently of the value of g.
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Proof in Appendix
Proposition 2 establishes the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for taxes to constitute a
Nash equilibrium strategy.14 Similarly to the previous case, we observe that taxes constitute
an equilibrium strategy only when the marginal damage cost coe¢ cient is su¢ ciently low in
absolute terms. However, a general policy rule can be proposed following the implications of
Proposition 2: When the marginal damage is steeper than the marginal cost of abatement, i.e.,
k > g, then a standard yields a superior outcome in terms of expected welfare, compared to a
tax. This appears because the critical value,

gf27+2g[27+g(16+3g)]g
,
3(1+g)2 (3+g)2

is lower than g. This result

is similar to the one derived by Weitzman (1974) and other papers in the relevant literature,
for the case of a regulator who is uncertain about the intercepts of abatement cost and damage
functions.
Despite this, the reverse is not always true. When the marginal cost of abatement runs
steeper than marginal damage, then several conditions must hold to favor a tax. As suggested by
) which is lower than g. This condition,
Proposition 2, k must lie below the critical value ( g(9+4g)
(3+2g)2
renders taxes a superior policy instrument compared to a standard. Even in this scenario taxes
do not always guarantee superior expected welfare outcomes as the outcome depends on the
level of var(u). As suggested in part (c) of Proposition 2, when k takes values above a speci…c
) then standards yield greater expected bene…ts compared to
critical value ( gf27+2g[27+g(16+3g)]g
3(1+g)2 (3+g)2
taxes, regardless of the level of var(u). Similarly to the case of demand uncertainty, when k

2

a standard always leads to a superior outcome in terms of expected welfare.
As in the previous subsection, although the results seem rather cumbersome, the driving
forces in the model are rather simple. Under uncertainty, when g is relatively high and k is
relatively low, then a tax is superior in terms of welfare than a standard. In terms of Weitzman’s
modeling it can be said that this result holds and taxes might lead to higher expected welfare,
yet only if uncertainty is su¢ ciently high. This is in line with the implications of Baldursson
and von der Fehr (2004), although their results are based on the fact that the decisions of some
agents are irreversible. In contrast to that, our bias towards taxes is attributed to the fact that
the use of taxes postulates greater ‡exibility to the …rms, in contrast to the use of standards.
When k is relatively high, then the cost associated with the use of taxes rises because pollution
14
Lemma 2 and Proposition 2 do not include the …rst part of the corresponding previous ones since the main
result remains una¤ected. When uncertainty is very low or close to zero, standards yield higher welfare regardless
of the strategy of the rival.
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volatility is very costly to the citizens. If g is low, modi…ed CR bene…ts increase when both
taxes and standards are implemented. Yet, even in such a scenario the implementation of taxes
is very unlikely because in most of the cases k will be relatively higher.
Another important implication resulting from Proposition 2 is that uncertainty about the
damage function does not a¤ect the choice of the policy instrument. This occurs because the
decisions of …rms in …nal stage remain una¤ected from any potential shocks in the damage
function. It is important to note here that this result is sensitive to the assumption that
uncertainties in the marginal cost of abatement and the marginal damage are uncorrelated.
According to Stavins (1996) this does not hold when this assumption is retracted. Following
Stavins’ rationale we should expect that when uncertainties are positively correlated, the use
of standards should become more likely. If uncertainties are negatively correlated then taxes
should be more favorable.
To wrap up and provide comprehensive results from the analysis in this section we provide
the following proposition:
Proposition 3:
When governments are uncertain about the intercepts of the marginal cost of abatement and
damage functions, and uncertainties are uncorrelated then:
a) k > g is a su¢ cient condition such that a standard is superior to a tax,
b) k < g is a necessary condition such that a tax is superior to a standard, and
c) uncertainty in marginal damage does not a¤ ect the ranking of the policy instruments.

4.3 Simultaneous Uncertainty
Given the results above we may infer what happens in case that uncertainty is present in the
demand, abatement and damage functions at the same time. In particular, when uncertainty
is relatively low the use of emission standards by the two governments is optimal as the bene…ts attributed to the use of taxes are minimized. This is also the case when the parameter
determining the damage from pollution, k, takes high values relative to the slope of marginal
abatement cost. Variability in pollution leads to signi…cant welfare losses making standards
more favorable.
On the other hand we shall expect that governments select taxes when the slope of marginal
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abatement cost, g, becomes steeper since the …rms gain an advantage compared to the case
where standards are implemented. It should be clear that this is due to the fact that …rms
are less ‡exible. Yet, this positive e¤ect is magni…ed and becomes a su¢ cient condition if and
only if the stochastic terms are signi…cantly large. The latter one is a core result of this paper,
bringing into light the key role of the level of uncertainty. In terms of policy making this means
that the regulator not only needs to compare the slopes or the elasticities of abatement cost and
marginal damage functions respectively, yet must take also into account the current conditions
in the economy. In uncertain times as nowadays, taxes may be implemented providing industries
with a ‡exibility to adjust to any possible unexpected variations. In a di¤erent case standards
o¤er a clear advantage. The fact that the economies are open strengthens the bias in favor of
standards compared to the original case suggested by Weitzman and the relevant literature. Of
course these results are not binding as in a real world setting things are much more complicated.
It provides, however, with important implications for occasions where the governments use
environmental policy instruments as "secondary" means to promote the exporting industries.

5 Concluding Remarks
The aim of this paper was to de…ne the optimal choice of the environmental policy instrument
in an international duopoly model, where governments use their policies not only to deal with
pollution but to shift rents towards their own …rms in an uncertain environment. The calculations needed in order to obtain the results are complex, but the obtained results are of general
validity.
In particular, we illustrated that when the regulators have full information, then standards
should be preferred to taxes in equilibrium in both countries. In other words, with no uncertainty standards constitute a Nash equilibrium strategy in the policy instrument choice game.
This result is stronger than the result suggested by Lahiri and Ono (2007), Ulph (1996b) and
Yanase (2007). However, in very uncertain environments taxes can break down the superiority
of standards, when the slope of marginal damage is relatively low. This is true only when
uncertainty is su¢ ciently high, which implies that the level of uncertainty matters.
Several concerns about the model may be expressed. For instance, the reader might wonder
how our results are a¤ected when we allow for transboundary pollution. Undoubtedly, climate
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change is a great challenge facing our economies today. As moderate estimates predict (Stern,
2007), if no immediate action takes place, future damages in GDP will range from 5%

20%

per year. Therefore, policy makers should design and implement CO2 emissions regulation. In
such a case our results are a¤ected quantitatively but not qualitatively. Since foreign pollution
is added to the local one, the damage caused from pollution to the society when one unit of
pollution is emitted is now higher. This enforces the governments to tighten regulation regardless
of the policy instrument used. In the sub-case where both governments implement a tax, the
negative e¤ect from the variability in pollution is now higher. This makes taxes less favorable
for a greater range of values of k. So, taxes are less likely to be used when the pollutant is
global.
Another objection to our model might be the absence of consumption of the exporting good
in the two exporting countries, which might a¤ect the derived welfare implications. Quirion
(2004), Heuson (2008a, 2008b) and Hoel (1998) re-examine using closed economy models, Weitzman’s question of "prices versus quantities" in second best environments. The authors claim
that in such an environment taxes admit a greater advantage over standards. Hence, in our
model we expect that the introduction of consumption in the two exporting countries, the imposition of a positive cost in public funds and the existence of unemployment will create an
extra bias towards taxes.
Nonetheless, our proposals should be used with care in policy implementation as our model
neglects the possibility of using other environmental policy instruments, such as mixed systems
that could possibly lead to higher welfare levels. Moreover, our model does not take into account
possible asymmetries between domestic and foreign functions, and only allows for risk neutral
policy makers. These provide stimulus for future research.

Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
a) De…ne
3

1

= 0:5g 3 (B

c)2 (2 + g)2 (g + k)2 1 ,

2

= 0:5g 3 (B

c)2 (2 + g)2 (g + k)2

2

and

= fg 2 (3+2g)[9+2g(4+g)]+gf54+gf132+g[120+g(48+7g)]ggk+(1+g)2 (3+g)2 (3+2g)k 2 g2 .
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If the foreign regulator chooses a standard we have:
g 2 f54 + 7g[12 + g(6 + g)]g
+gf108 + gf264 + g[238 + g(95 + 14g)]ggk
lim

var( );var(u)!0

(EwzZ

EwtZ ) =

+2(1 + g)2 (3 + g)2 (3 + 2g)k 2

1
m2

> 0: (A1)
3

If the foreign regulator chooses a tax we have:
g 2 f54 + g[84 + g(46 + 9g)]g
+g(3 + 2g)f36 + g[64 + g(38 + 7g)]gk
lim

var( );var(u)!0

(EwzT

EwtT ) =

+2(1 + g)2 (3 + g)2 (3 + 2g)k 2

2
n2

> 0:

(A2)

3

Using equations (A1) and (A2) we observe that when var( ), var(u)! 0 standards are a dominant strategy Q.E.D.
b)It can be shown that:
gf15 + 2g[12 + g(6 + g)]g
+(1 + g)2 (3 + g)2 k
EwzZ

EwtZ =

lim

var( );var(u)!0

(EwzZ

EwtZ ) +

2(3 + g)2 (3 + 2g)2

var( ): (A3)

For a tax to be preferred to a standard when the rival chooses a standard, EwzZ
If k <

gf15+2g[12+g(6+g)]g
(1+g)2 (3+g)2

and var( )>

)2(3+g)2 (3+2g)2

limvar( );var(u)!0 (EwzZ EwtZ
gf15+2g[12+g(6+g)]g+(1+g)2 (3+g)2 k

EwtZ < 0.

then (A3) has

a negative sign. Finally, we need to add the necessary condition for the existence of an interior
solution which is k >

g
(1+g)(3+g)

Q.E.D.

c) It can be shown that:

EwzT

EwtT =

lim

var( );var(u)!0

(EwzT

EwtT ) +

g(15 + 8g) + (3 + 2g)2 k
var( ):
18(3 + 2g)2

(A4)

For a tax to be preferred to a standard when the rival chooses a tax, the right hand side of (A4)
should be negative. If k <

g(15+8g)
(3+2g)2

var( )>

limvar(

EwtT )18(3+2g)2
g(15+8g)+(3+2g)2 k

);var(u)!0 (EwzT

then (A4) has

a negative sign. Finally, we need to add the necessary condition for the existence of an interior
solution which is k >

g
3+2g

Q.E.D.
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d)It can be shown that:

EwzZ

EwtT =

and limvar(

lim

var( );var(u)!0

);var(u)!0 (EwzZ

(EwzZ

EwtT ) +

g(3 + 2g) + (3 + g)2 k
var( );
18(3 + g)2

(A5)

EwtT ) > 0. For expected welfare when taxes are implemented

(by both regulators), to be superior to the corresponding one when standards are used (by
both governments), the right hand side of (A5) should be negative. If k <
limvar(

EwtT
g(3+2g)+(3+g)2 k

);var(u)!0 (EwzZ

)18(3+2g)2

g(3+2g)
(3+g)2

and var( )>

then (A5) has a negative sign. Additionally we need to

insert the necessary condition for the existence of an interior solution which is k >

g
3+2g

Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition 1:
a) From part a) of Lemma 1 we get that when var( ), var(u)! 0 standards are a dominant
strategy for both governments. Hence, when var( ), var(u)! 0 the unique Nash equilibrium is
the one where both governments select standards Q.E.D.
b)If we compare the upper limits of the restrictions for k in b) and c) of Lemma 1 we obtain
g(15+8g)
(3+2g)2

gf15+2g[12+g(6+g)]g
(1+g)2 (3+g)2

=

g 2 (2+g)[18+g(24+7g)]
(1+g)2 (3+g)2 (3+2g)2

> 0. If we compare the lower limits of the

restrictions for k in b) and c) of Lemma 1, we obtain

g
(3+2g)

g
(1+g)(3+g)

=

g 2 (2+g)
(1+g)(3+g)(3+2g)

> 0.

We further assume that the restrictions given for var( ) satisfy both inequalities given in b) and
c) of the previous lemma. Given b) and c) from Lemma 1, when

g
(3+2g)

<k<

gf15+2g[12+g(6+g)]g
,
(1+g)2 (3+g)2

choosing taxes for the domestic government will be a dominant strategy. Since the model is
symmetric the same holds for the foreign regulator. This su¢ ces for choosing emission taxes as
policy instruments at the Nash equilibrium Q.E.D.
c) The equilibrium strategy for the domestic government is determined by the following:
maxfEwzZ ; EwtZ gand maxfEwzT ; EwtT g. Given

g(15+8g)
(3+2g)2

>k>

gf15+2g[12+g(6+g)]g
,
(1+g)2 (3+g)2

the results

and the restrictions for var( ) given in b) and c) of Lemma 1, we observe that when the foreign
government selects a standard then it is optimal for the domestic government to pool to the
same strategy (i.e., EwzZ > EwtZ ). If the foreign regulator chooses a tax then the domestic
government selects a tax as well (i.e., EwzT < EwtT ). Hence, the equilibrium strategy of each
regulator is conditional to the strategy of the rival. Given these we obtain two symmetric Nash
equilibria in pure strategies where both governments select either standards or taxes. Since we
have two symmetric equilibria in pure strategies it is directly implied that a Nash equilibrium in
mixed strategies exists. In this equilibrium each government selects its policy instrument with a
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positive probability. This probability is derived as the weighted value of expected welfare when
a standard is used, and equals the corresponding one when a tax is implemented. The weights
are the probabilities assigned in the strategies of the rival regulator Q.E.D.
d) If k >

g(15+8g)
,
(3+2g)2

then using b) and c) from Lemma 1 we obtain that choosing standards is

a dominant strategy and hence the unique Nash equilibrium involves both governments using
standards, irrespective of var( ).
If we di¤erentiate the threshold level for k,
9(5+2g)
.
(3+2g)3

g(15+8g)
(3+2g)2

d

, with respect to g we get

g(15+8g)
(3+2g)2

dg

=

This implies that the threshold level is continuously increasing in the level of g. If we

take the limit of the threshold level as g tends to in…nity we obtain limg!1

g(15+8g)
(3+2g)2

= 2 Q.E.D.

Proof of Superiority of Standards in Terms of Pollution:
In order to provide a comparison of standards and taxes in terms of pollution we need to
take the di¤erence of pollution equilibrium levels when standards and taxes are used in both
countries:
z

zt =

(B

c)2 g 2 (2 + g)(3 + g)(g + k)
mn

3

:

(A6)

From (A6) we observe that pollution is greater in equilibrium when taxes are used instead of
standards unless a signi…cant negative shock occurs in demand Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2:
a)It can be shown that:
3f gf27 + 2g[27 + g(16 + 3g)]g
+3(1 + g)2 (3 + g)2 kg
EwzZ EwtZ =

lim

var( );var(u)!0

(EwzZ EwtZ )+

2g 2 (3 + g)2 (3 + 2g)2

For a tax to be preferred to a standard when the rival chooses a standard EwzZ
k<

gf27+2g[27+g(16+3g)]g
3(1+g)2 (3+g)2

and var(u)>

var(u): (A7)

EwtZ < 0. If

)2g 2 (3+g)2 (3+2g)2

limvar( );var(u)!0 (EwzZ EwtZ
3f gf27+2g[27+g(16+3g)]g+3(1+g)2 (3+g)2 kg

this is true.

Finally, we need to add the necessary condition for the existence of an interior solution which
is k >

g
(1+g)(3+g)

Q.E.D.

b) It can be shown that:

EwzT

EwtT =

lim

var( );var(u)!0

(EwzT

EwtT ) +

g(9 + 4g) + (3 + 2g)2 k
var(u):
2g 2 (3 + 2g)2

(A8)
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If EwzT
that k <

EwtT < 0 then a tax is preferred to a standard when the rival chooses a tax. In case
g(9+4g)
(3+2g)2

limvar(

and var(u)>

EwtT )2g 2 (3+2g)2
g(9+4g)+(3+2g)2 k

);var(u)!0 (EwzT

then (A8) has a negative

sign. Finally, we need to add the necessary condition for the existence of an interior solution
which is k >

g
3+2g

Q.E.D.

c)It can be shown that:

EwzZ

EwtT =

lim

var( );var(u)!0

It can be shown that limvar(
at the same time var(u)>

(EwzZ

EwtT ) +

);var(u)!0 (EwzZ

limvar(

g(9 + 4g) + (3 + g)2 k
var(u):
2g 2 (3 + g)2

EwtT ) > 0. In case that k <

EwtT
g(9+4g)+(3+g)2 k

);var(u)!0 (EwzZ

)2g 2 (3+g)2

g(9+4g)
(3+g)2

(A9)

and

then (A9) has a negative sign.

Additionally we need to insert the necessary condition for the existence of an interior solution
which is k >

g
3+2g

Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition 2:
a)If we compare the upper limits of the restrictions for k in a) and b) of Lemma 2 we obtain
gf27+2g[27+g(16+3g)]g
3(1+g)2 (3+g)2

g(9+4g)
(3+2g)2

=

g 2 f54+gf162+g[174+g(77+12g)]gg
3(1+g)2 (3+g)2 (3+2g)2

> 0. We further assume that the

restrictions given about var(u) satisfy both inequalities given in a) and b) of the Lemma 2.
Given these, when

g
(3+2g)

<k<

g(9+4g)
,
(3+2g)2

choosing taxes for the domestic government will be a

dominant strategy. Since the model is symmetric the same holds for the foreign regulator as
well. This is su¢ cient in order to achieve emission taxes as a Nash equilibrium Q.E.D.
b) The equilibrium strategy for the domestic government is obtained by: maxfEwzZ ; EwtZ g
and maxfEwzT ; EwtT g. Given

gf27+2g[27+g(16+3g)]g
3(1+g)2 (3+g)2

>k >

g(9+4g)
,
(3+2g)2

the restrictions for var(u)

and the results given in a) and b) of Lemma 2, we observe that when the foreign government
selects a standard, then it is optimal for the domestic government to separate its own strategy
(i.e., EwzZ < EwtZ ). If the foreign regulator chooses a tax then the domestic government selects
a standard (i.e., EwzT > EwtT ). Hence, the equilibrium strategy of each regulator is conditional
to the strategy of the rival. Given these, we obtain two asymmetric Nash equilibria in pure
strategies. It follows directly that we attain a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies where each
government selects its policy instrument with a positive probability. This probability is derived
as the weighted value of expected welfare, when a standard is used equals the corresponding
one when a tax is implemented. The weights are the probabilities assigned in the strategies of
the rival regulator Q.E.D.
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c) If k >

gf27+2g[27+g(16+3g)]g
3(1+g)2 (3+g)2

then using a) and b) from Lemma 2 we obtain that choos-

ing standards is a dominant strategy and hence the unique Nash equilibrium involves both
governments using standards irrespective of var(u).
If we di¤erentiate the threshold level of k,
d

gf27+2g[27+g(16+3g)]g
3(1+g)2 (3+g)2

dg

=

gf27+2g[27+g(16+3g)]g
3(1+g)2 (3+g)2

81+gf216+g[207+4g(23+4g)]g
.
3(1+g)3 (3+g)3

, with respect to g we get

This implies that the threshold level is con-

tinuously increasing in the level of g. If we take the limit of the threshold level as g tends to
in…nity we obtain limg!1

gf27+2g[27+g(16+3g)]g
3(1+g)2 (3+g)2

= 2 Q.E.D.
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